The Myanmar Defence Services are giving themselves a new structure and getting ready for a generational change of leadership, albeit slowly.

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There are signs a new dynamic may emerge within the Myanmar Defence Services (MDS) armed forces, as well as in their relationship with the central and provincial governments of the 14 regions and states in the country.

The MDS began as an offspring of the national struggle for independence. Their founding members were nationalists of socialist persuasion rather than professional soldiers. As the most powerful and enduring institution in Myanmar, it has played a dominant role in shaping the state's political contours and developed a Praetorian ethos. The first-generation military leadership, who made their mark during the anti-fascist revolution against the Japanese, fashioned a tradition extending beyond national defence requirements and bordering on the political, to become the guarantor as well as the embodiment of state authority. This led to the MDS taking over the reins of power three times since independence and, in more than six decades of sovereign statehood, the armed forces have ruled Myanmar directly for almost half that period.

After assuming power in September 1988, the ruling junta (currently the State Peace and Development Council or SPDC) embarked upon a rapid expansion of the MDS in terms of manpower and equipment, transforming it from a counter-insurgency force to one capable of fighting conventional wars. This led to the creation of new command and staff positions as well as combat and support formations, increasing the number of active-duty generals (one star and above) to more than 100 from less than 20 in 1988. Manpower doubled and modern weapon systems were acquired, despite an arms embargo by Western democracies.

Within 90 days of the confirmation of election results by the Union Election Commission, a new constitutional government must be formed and the MDS have a major role to play. On the other hand, there are indications it would not be 'business as usual'.

The much-anticipated change to third generation leaders would bring in a fresh cohort of generals some two decades behind the cohort who commanded the MDS in the era of the 1990 elections. A new modus operandi between retired generals in the union government in Naypyitaw and the military command hierarchy of junior generals has to be developed. Powerful regional commanders would no longer be entitled to exercise executive power in their territories, but only be vested with authority over military matters. The chief ministers, presidential appointees, would hold sway over administration of the 14 states and regions whose boundaries overlap with corresponding regional military commands.

As such, a new modus vivendi has to be worked out between the regional commander and the chief minister (many may turn out to be retired generals senior to the former), as well with the line ministries under ministers (again likely to be retired senior generals) appointed by the executive president. Moreover, region and state parliaments are also expected to play a role in the political governance of their respective territories.

This new structure of regional authority is completely different from the top-down command structure exercised by the regional commanders during the SPDC era. All in all, the introduction of a form of pluralism in the body politic and a relatively flatter power distribution poses new challenges as well as opportunities for the MDS in post-elections Myanmar. One step removed from direct political governance, the new Tatmadaw leadership could devote more attention, time and energy towards enhancing professionalism in the MDS as well as initiate steps towards developing a new paradigm for civil-military relations conducive to nation-building and human security.

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