Has the prospect of Myanmar’s Asean chairmanship in 2014 tamed the region’s ‘problem child’?

Meetings of the leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) have always been assured of attention-grabbing headlines since Myanmar joined the Association in 1997. Asean has faced much criticism on its decision to admit into its ranks a country still in the grips of a military dictatorship.

Asean’s lowest point with its difficult member was in 2007. The junta’s repression of peaceful demonstrations by monks (later joined by civilians) exasperated the body. Hope dimmed that Myanmar would ever fulfill the commitments it had expressed upon joining Asean.

A small window of hope, however, opened in the wake of Cyclone Nargis in 2008. Over the looming humanitarian crisis in the country, Asean brokered what was considered a breakthrough in coordinating the entry and operation of aid workers ‘regardless of nationality’, a promise that has been kept to this day.

Still, the path to reform was murky. The 2003 seven-step roadmap to democracy inched at a painstakingly slow pace toward the holding of ‘free and fair elections’. Elections were held in November 2010, but they were anything but free and fair in the eyes of many.

The ‘civilianised’ government took office in early 2011 amid considerable scepticism it would undertake the much-needed and long-awaited reforms. However, the country, which has been known as the ‘problem child’ of Asean, began introducing a series of measures oriented towards reform.

Starting with the release of Aung San Suu Kyi in November 2010, the new government went about diluting the military’s omnipresent role in the country’s daily life; relaxed the tight controls over the local media, including announcing that the censorship board should be abolished; started regular meetings with Aung San Suu Kyi, also including her in discussions on economic reforms; and, for the first time in a quarter-century, acceded to popular demands by halting a controversial hydro-electric dam project (financed by China) at the confluence of the two rivers forming the Irrawaddy.

Two amnesties followed one after the other, although not all political prisoners have been released. Foreign media have been allowed entry into the country.

Asean has responded by giving Myanmar its turn to chair and host the Asean Summits in 2014. The decision is a blend of incentive and monitoring: There is no turning back for the country, no backtracking on the reform process, only an inexorable push forward.

There is also no turning back for Asean. Having justified its decision, Asean has to ensure the reforms result in democracy and development beyond 2014. To address concerns by rights groups and parliamentarians, Asean must now step up its strategy of ‘enhanced interaction’ with Myanmar. Helping rebuild Myanmar’s human capital, assisting the resuscitation and strengthening of the country’s civil society, and assisting dialogue with the ethnic nationalities, will add to restoring democracy, transparency and accountability, as will promoting the rights of women, children and migrants. 

The path that lies ahead for Myanmar and Asean is not an easy one. Many compromises will have to be made, internally and with external parties. Myanmar will learn – under the spotlight – the highs of accomplishment and the lows of backsliding (or even signs of it). Myanmar has now become the test case for setting new benchmarks in living up to the purposes of the Asean Charter, especially with regard to democracy, good governance and the rule of law, and human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The work has just begun. But this time, it has begun for real.

Moe Thuzar, lead researcher at the Asean Studies Centre of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies